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The reason for this would be to ensure that Russia manages to give a proper response to
perceived threats from NATO and its allies. Furthermore, by regaining its deterrence power,
Russia would be better equipped to maintain the ‘balance of power’ between itself and the
West in Europe and deter any potential direct aggression against itself. In addition, it would
serve as a show of power to other nations that Russia would be willing to use its nuclear
weapons if deemed necessary, besides allowing Russia to retain its status as a major global
player especially in the military aspect. Perhaps however, the most important of these reasons
could be that Russia would want to rejuvenate its deterrence factor as a result of it nukes, as a
strategic move to gain leverage in negotiations for the Russia-Ukraine issue and to ensure
their interests and territorial security are protected.
Moreover, evidence such as Russian international affairs expert and former lawmaker Alexey
Arbatov’s analysis back in 2000, which called for Russia to “...enhance its nuclear forces to
deter not just nuclear, but also, large–scale conventional attacks…” also seems to resonate
with Mr. Putin’s supposed plans, which some believe he has decided to rely upon in the case
of the Ukraine conflict, which would as stated in Arbatov’s paper be, “a suicidal threat of
nuclear escalation [that] could present a credible deterrent against a full-scale, theater-wide
conventional aggression — including major ground warfare.”
This analysis, given nearly 22 years before the Russian operation in Ukraine, still does hold
true to much of what Putin intends to and is currently acting upon. Whereas nuclear
deterrence would indeed be more effective as a result of such a strategy, it can also be argued
that in present-day, the use of a nuclear weapon in the conflict in Ukraine by Russia which
looks incredibly likely due to such a strategy, might just avert the threat of a larger
conventional or a nuclear confrontation in Europe or elsewhere.
Conclusion;
In conclusion, Russia may be driven to use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine due to several
factors. These include reasons such as Russia’s slow progress and increasing weariness
because of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, which leads to subsequent factors which do not
bode well for Russia including more casualties, a heightened risk of losing territory, as well
as Mr Putin falling out of favour amongst the Russian public, and perhaps most importantly,
the ruining of Russia’s reputation and international prestige along with its inability to counter
Western hegemony and the alleged threat to Russia’s security. It can ultimately be derived
that President Putin and the Russian Federation might accede to their desire of nuclear
weapons to avert the aforementioned results. However, while Russia may be ‘forced’ to use
nuclear weapons, it is also unlikely that it will use it on the entirety of Ukraine in large
numbers, due to the fear of NATO, being the biggest military backer of Ukraine, and also
having members possessing nuclear weapons, deciding to give a conventional or nuclear
response in turn and secondly, the threat of nuclear fallout reaching the territory of the
Russian Federation.
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